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Chikara Hashimoto on intelligence and counter-subversion during 
the twilight of the British Empire - an enduring scholarly legacy 





The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in the 
Middle East, 1948-63, by Chikara Hashimoto (edited by Rory Cormac), Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 2017/ 2019, pp. xiv+290. £75.00 (hbk, 2017), £24.99 (pbk, 
2019). ISBN: 9781474410458 (hbk); ISBN: 9781464453028 (pbk).  
 
‘We cannot allow [Nasser], who has neither the authority of a throne nor 
of a parliament to destroy our base and threaten our rear’ Harold 
Macmillan, diary entry for 23 September 19551 
 
‘The ‘Nasserite’ revolt in Iraq has failed. But this may mean that the 
present regime [in Baghdad] will go more and more Communist. We are 
in a bad position here – between the devil and the sea’ Harold Macmillan, 
diary entry for 11 March 19592 
 
The task of reviewing a book becomes a harder one when the author is deceased. As readers 
of Intelligence and National Security are in all likelihood aware, Chikara Hashimoto (who 
was an assistant editor of this journal) died in September 2016 a month short of what would 
have been his forty-first birthday.3 Every reviewer has an obligation to provide an objective 
and fair account of a book’s quality, and that requirement comes far more important when 
work is published posthumously. It is hoped that what is written here does this monograph 
- and its author - justice.4 
 
The Twilight of the British Empire is based on Hashimoto’s PhD thesis (entitled ‘British 
Intelligence, Counter-Subversion and “Informal Empire” in the Middle East’) which was 
awarded the Leigh Douglas Memorial Prize in 2014, an honour for the best doctoral thesis 
on a Middle Eastern topic awarded by the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. It is 
a history of British intelligence liaison in the Middle East in the immediate post-war era, 
at a time when the United Kingdom was determined to maintain its sphere of influence in 
the region, where Britain had a long-standing presence.5 After 1945, successive British 
governments sought to protect their imperial possessions and semi-colonial protectorates 
in the Middle East, and also secure access to Arab and Iranian oilfields. Those same 
governments saw the primary threat to British power in the Middle East as being Soviet-
inspired Communism, and as the threat of a third global conflict receded, the challenged 
posed by subversion directed against pro-British régimes was deemed to be more 
important.6 William Magan, onetime head of Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME)7 – 
the regional headquarters of the British security service, MI5 - later noted that the ‘Soviet 
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[Union] was intent on destabilising the Middle East. I was heavily committed to keeping it 
stable.’8 After 1945, there was some confusion (and in-fighting) between MI5 and SIS as 
to the demarcation of responsibilities in the Middle East (where SIME operated in a number 
of countries: some independent, some – such as Palestine – under British control).9 The 
director of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, asserted that, ‘I cannot but believe that the energies 
of the Security Service [MI5] would be better devoted to problems confronting it in this 
county, where I suspect that a great deal of work could usefully done in combating 
Communist penetration.’10 Successive British governments after 1945 were wholly aware 
overseas policy played far well internationally when it cast Britain as a bastion of stability 
against Soviet-sponsored nationalists engaging in KGB-orchestrated subversive activities. 
As British governments struggled with decline and decolonisation, policy makers sought 
to appease the rising tide of Third World nationalism and anti-imperialism. Following the 
deposition of the pro-British government in Iraq in 1958, and whilst US forces intervened 
in Lebanon to prevent civil war, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd rather 
unconvincingly assured the  House of Commons that Britain did not regard nationalism in 
the Middle East as its enemy. 
 
We have no quarrel with nationalism. We have done a great deal to meet 
the aspirations of nationalism in many parts of the world. Both sides of 
the House have responsibilities in that matter. We made no difficulty 
about modifying our treaty with Iraq concerning the handing over of the 
Habbaniya air base to the Iraqi Government. We agreed to the ending of 
the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. 
 
It is suggested that in these areas we support only reactionary régimes, 
whatever that may mean. So far as material developments are concerned, 
however, the achievements of the régime in Iraq were outstanding. It was 
the place where the oil revenues were spent most wisely. The 
statesmanship of the Iraqi leaders has provided great benefits for the 
people of that country. Perhaps they failed in not making clearer to their 
people how much had been done and there were, perhaps, certain 
weaknesses in the way of urbanisation; but so far as concerns the material 
results of the work of the Iraq Development Board, they were very much 
better than anything done in any other part of the Middle East. I spoke to 
somebody yesterday who had just been to the Iraq Development Week 
and he spoke of the great surprise with which he had seen the extent of 
the work that was being done. 
 
So this is not a question of nationalism. It is part of the hostile propaganda 
to say that this is all a question of the West against Arab nationalism. The 
question is one of perverting nationalist feelings and perverting those 
who wish to overthrow the established order of society so that they serve 
to further indirect aggression.11 
 
As anti-British propaganda poured forth from Moscow, London sought to portray Third 
World nationalist movements were as mere stooges of a tireless campaign of global 
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Communist subversion. Nearly a year earlier, Lloyd had deployed the standard line in anti-
Soviet rhetoric (the tone of which typified official British attitudes). 
 
All the Soviets’ current actions seem designed to cause the maximum 
trouble to Britain and our friends … In his speech on Wednesday, [Soviet 
General Secretary] Khrushchev said: ‘The imperialists are trying at all 
costs to prolong their domination in the Asian and African countries. One 
must not minimise the danger threatening the peoples of the East. 
Immutable historic facts, however, prove that the decline of imperialism 
in the East is about to begin. The peoples of Asia and Africa possess 
disinterested friends in the Soviet Union.’ Never has so much 
suppression of the truth and suggestion of the false been crammed into a 
few short sentences. […] Meanwhile, the only empire which has steadily 
grown since 1945 has been that of the Soviet Union.12  
 
The global Cold War saw British governments attempt to manage their empire in the age 
of decolonization against the background of the rise of global Communism.13 In December 
1955 Prime Minister Anthony Eden was very precise in his definition of the manner in 
which Britain was to rise to the challenge: ‘The term ‘counter-subversion’ is used in this 
paper to mean clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or operations, directed against 
Communism or, in the Colonies, against subversive forms of nationalism’.14 In his 
rendering of the British struggle against subversion, Hashimoto’s book builds on research 
by authors such as Richard Aldrich, Rory Cormac and Calder Walton.15 The Twilight of 
the British Empire analyses the role that SIME played in co-ordinating the counter-
subversive efforts of the police and security services of regional allies,16 including the 
founding states of the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organisation, or CENTO).17 
In the process, Hashimoto provides an incisive and intriguing account of a hitherto 
neglected aspect of British policy in the post-war Middle East, which will be invaluable to 
scholars of the Cold War, Middle Eastern studies, imperialism, intelligence history and 
British post-1945 foreign policy. 
 
CENTO is widely considered by Cold War historians to have been a ‘failed alliance’ (to 
paraphrase the title of one of Panagiotis Dimitrakis’ books).18 In military terms, it certainly 
was a pale imitation of its North Atlantic analogue, but as late as August 1957 Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan mused as to whether the or not ‘the Baghdad Pact [could] be 
extended and remodelled’.19 Confirming and amplifying this point Hashimoto 
demonstrates that, as far as intelligence and security co-operation were concerned, the 
Baghdad Pact had real substance to it, with the British liaising with their Iranian, Iraqi 
(until the July 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty),20 Pakistani and Turkish 
counterparts.21 Such liaisons were very important to British intelligence as Britain’s SIS 
was every thinly spread across most of the Middle East.22 SIME also developed contacts 
with the Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese security services – the extent of the latter, and 
the relationship MI5 developed with Emir Farid Chehab (the head of Lebanon’s Sûreté 
Générale) were very much a revelation for these reviewers.23 That said, Farid Chehab’s 
anti-Communist sentiment was well known and, in 1954, he informed a Middle East Time 
correspondent that  
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If it comes to [a] war, the Middle East will fall to the Communists 
inevitably. Just as inevitably you’ll have to take it back. The West could 
not abide Russia controlling the Middle East. It’ll be a lot easier to take 
it back if the people are on your side. If they’re not on your side it will 
be almost impossible to take it back.24 
 
Such fears underpinned the British recourse to Realpolitik in their policy towards the states 
of the Middle East. In October 1955 British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan noted 
that Syria was ‘moving into the Moscow-Cairo axis. … Altho’ [sic] there are grave 
objections to an Iraqui [sic] coup to take over Syria, there are equal (perhaps greater) 
dangers in allowing Syria to go Communist.’25 In his memoirs Sir Anthony Eden (prime 
minister, 1955-7) recalled that ‘Russia regarded Cairo as a future Soviet outpost, and 
communist sympathizers were busy in the [Middle East], notably in Syria and Iraq.’ Eden 
recalled that, a few days before his murder in the coup of July 1958, Iraqi’s pro-British 
prime minister, Nuri al-Said, had warned: ‘All this shows that unless Nasser is checked, 
events in the Middle East will continue on a large scale in favour of Russia.’26  
 
In July 1956, a few days after Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal, Eden outlined the 
danger posed to British interests in the House of Commons. 
 
As the world is today, and as it is likely to be for some time to come, the 
industrial life of Western Europe literally depends upon the continuing 
free navigation of the [Suez] Canal as one of the great international 
waterways of the world […] 
 
Is it possible for us to believe the word of the present Egyptian 
Government to the extent of leaving it in their power alone to decide 
whether these supplies shall reach the Western World through the Canal? 
I truly think that we have done everything in our power during the years 
- sometimes under criticism - by our actions and by our Treaty, to show 
our good will. I think that we have. Our reward has been a broken faith, 
and broken promises. We have been subjected to a ceaseless barrage of 
propaganda. This has been accompanied by intrigue, and by attempts at 
subversion in British territories. 
 
Colonel Nasser’s arbitrary action in breach of Egypt’s solemn 
undertakings, many of them recently given, without previous 
consultation or previous notice-reveals the nature of the régime with 
which we have to deal; and I think that the action of the Egyptian 
Government in compelling the Canal Company employees to remain at 
their posts under threat of imprisonment is certainly, to say the least, a 
violation of human rights.27 
 
A day earlier Eden had been more succinct in outlining the British position. ‘No 
arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her 
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Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power 
which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it purely for purposes of national 
policy.’28 As the crisis over Suez continued, British official concern only seemed to mount. 
On 10 September 1956, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, wrote that:  
 
If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually 
acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to 
our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to 
us for a year or two, our gold reserves will disappear. If our gold reserves 
disappear, the Sterling area disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates 
and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a force in 
Germany, or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to 
pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that 
cannot provide for its defence is finished.29 
 
Eden had four main goals during the Suez Crisis of 1956. First, to secure the Suez Canal; 
second, to ensure that the canal remained open and that oil shipments to Britain and the 
West were not disrupted; third, to depose Nasser (by any means necessary);30 and, fourth, 
to halt the rise of Soviet influence in the Middle East. In all of these aims his policy failed. 
As D.R. Thorpe has noted: ‘The immediate consequence of the crisis was that the Suez 
Canal was blocked, oil supplies were interrupted, Nasser’s position as the leader of Arab 
nationalism was strengthened, and the way was left open for Russian intrusion into the 
Middle East.’31 Eden later lamented that, despite British protests and press reports of Soviet 
penetration of Egypt, the United States continued to press the British to withdraw from the 
Canal Zone as quickly as possible after the Suez War.32 In truth, and despite the fact that 
Britain and the United States enjoyed the supposedly closest imaginable ‘Special 
Relationship’ in the Cold War, Washington had long sought to displace the British Empire 
as the predominant power in the Middle East.33 From London’s perspective, Washington’s 
perceived lack of concern over Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, 
was thus seen as nothing short of neglecting the vital interests of its closest ally. Years 
afterwards, Eden recalled a conversation with the Conservative MP Enoch Powell in which 
Powell had apparently told him, in the late 1940s, that ‘I want to tell you that in the Middle 
East our great enemies are the Americans.’ When Eden relayed the story he added, 
mournfully, ‘You know, I had no idea what he meant. I do now.’34 
 
In late 1957, by which time Harold Macmillan was prime minister, ‘events’ in the Middle 
East had engendered an event greater sense of pessimism.35 ‘The situation is very like that 
over Suez. How to find an occasion or reason for intervention?’ Macmillan feared that ‘if 
nothing is done, there may be a rapid, and perhaps fatal, deterioration in the M.E., with its 
ultimate loss to Russia. … Even King Saud [of Saudi Arabia] is said to be alarmed at the 
spread of Communism. All the same, nothing is done’.36 Of course, the British 
government’s strategy of harnessing regional antagonism to Soviet Communism in the 
Middle East was repeated elsewhere - and by many states - across the globe.37 (In line with 
this notion of my ‘enemy’s enemy being my friend’, Hashimoto notes that MI5 also played 
an advisory role in the establishment of Shah Reza Pahlavi’s notorious secret police, the 
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SAVAK, in Iran after 1957).38 Such efforts notwithstanding, in 1960 Eden reflected bitterly 
on the demise of British, and Western, influence in the Middle East. 
 
[After 1958 no] attempt was made redeem Iraq or to halt the deterioration 
in the Middle East. With communist influence and authority in Iraq, the 
Russian dream of access to the Persian Gulf draws nearer. These 
developments will not be checked by support for Nasser in the role of 
anti-communist dictator. To attempt this would be as useless as it was to 
seek to use Mussolini against Hitler [in the 1930s] and would result in 
the final annihilation of the West.39 
 
Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of British grand strategy in the Middle East, both 
Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew argue that the British had considerable success in 
preserving influence with their former colonies in the intelligence security spheres, not 
least through the efforts of MI5’s Security Liaison Officers (SLOs) in advising their 
counterparts in newly independent states.40 But, as Hashimoto notes, similar efforts in the 
Middle East and South-West Asia largely ended in failure. The work done in building 
liaison ties with Chehab was undermined when he lost his job after the Lebanese crisis of 
July 1958. The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq meant that the head of the 
Iraqi CID, Colonel Bajhat Beg Attiyah, was executed along with other allies of the UK by 
Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassim’s régime.41 Hashimoto convincingly demonstrates that 
there were five main factors contributed to this failure. 
 
The first failure identified by Hashimoto involved inter-service and inter-agency disputes. 
This was partly the result of the fact that demarcation of the domestic and foreign 
intelligence missions (represented by MI5 and SIS, respectively) was very difficult to 
achieve in territories controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the British government. (In 
late 1948 Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director General of MI5, had warned Sir Edward Bridges, 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, that: ‘We are faced with a situation in which S.I.S. is 
given an ill-defined security responsibility which overlaps with mine.’)42 There was an 
inherent clash of interests between SIME’s task of building security co-operation with 
regional governments, and the role of the Secret Intelligence Service in conducting ‘special 
political action’ (covert operations) in the Middle East.43 In Iraq, SIME had to contend with 
the mistrust of the Royal Air Force (RAF), which had been largely responsible for the 
military defence of British interests there since the 1920s,44 because of its institutional ties 
with the British Army.45 British security co-operation with pliant allies also foundered 
because of rivalries between local bodies. Hashimoto points out that one reason why the 
1958 Iraqi revolution took the UK by surprise was because the Iraqi police – the main point 
of contact for the British in intelligence matters – enjoyed a very poor relationship with the 
armed forces there.46 In Iran, the SAVAK was divided between its internal and external 
branches, hampering counter-subversion co-operation in the process.47 Co-operation with 
the Egyptian police foundered well before the Free Officers’ coup against King Farouk in 
July 1952,48 not least because the latter were openly supporting guerrilla attacks on the 
British garrison in the Suez Canal zone.49 
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The second factor Hashimoto deals with involves the growing unpopularity of British 
imperialism in the Middle East,50 which also manifested itself in the popular support corded 
to nationalist figures such as Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and Mohammed Mossadeq in 
Iran. Mossadeq was actually ousted by an Anglo-American orchestrated coup in 1953,51 
and, although the US is usually credited with taking the lead in Iran, it was the Labour 
Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison who first sanctioned subverting Mossadeq’s 
government after Prime Minister Clement Attlee had vetoed military against it.52 Robert 
T. Harrison noted in his recent history of British involvement in the Middle East that, after 
1945, it seemed that ‘Britain’s control of the Middle East would once more become that 
vital entity of deliverance and triumph as it had been in the Great War. Yet this 
unchallenged policy unknowingly and inevitably bore the seeds of Britain’s demise in the 
region and retreat in the world.’53 After the Second World War, suspicion and fear of 
Britain even extended to nominal allies. Conspiracy theories have a long pedigree in the 
Middle East,54 not least because not only have external powers (such as the USA and UK) 
been repeatedly involved in covert coup plotting, but the indigenous governments have 
also constantly schemed against each other.55 The Suez Crisis did Britain’s reputation no 
favours – not least because its diplomats (kept out of the loop by Anthony Eden) repeatedly 
assured allied governments in the region that their country had not colluded with the French 
and the Israelis against Nasser.56 Nonetheless, the image of the British as master 
conspirators had some odd consequences, not least the conclusion by General Teymour 
Bakhtiar (the chief of SAVAK) that the Iraqi revolution of 1958 was actually orchestrated 
by Perfidious Albion, and that the fiercely anti-British Brigadier Qassim was actually 
Britain’s puppet.57  
 
A third problem discussed by Hashimoto involves national priorities. If the UK was 
focussed on the threat of Soviet-backed subversives, CENTO allies had their own specific 
concerns, with the Pakistanis focussed on India, the Iranians on Iraq (after 1958) and the 
Turks on the Kurds.58 The politicisation of intelligence and security matters was also an 
inherent risk. Regional rulers such as Shah Reza Pahlavi and King Hussein of Jordan 
became the effective heads of their own secret services,59 and in Iran anti-Communist 
propaganda was devalued because it was conflated with sycophantic eulogies for the 
Shah.60 Part of the appeal of ideologies such as Communism and anti-Western nationalism 
was that they capitalised on local discontent with corrupt and repressive régimes that 
blocked any progress on much-needed internal reform.61 Britain’s allies and their security 
police services created their own enemies,62 a point that to take one example, was 
graphically demonstrated by the Shah’s overthrow forty years ago. 
 
Fourth, Hashimoto outlines the problems arising from the fact that there were inherent 
linguistic and cultural difficulties between Britain and its regional partners. When Captain 
Guy Liddell (MI5’s Deputy Director General) lectured visiting Iranian military intelligence 
officers on the Communist threat in November 1950, he noted that he had to speak ‘very 
slowly’ while repeating what he had to say ‘at least three times’ in an attempt to get his 
audience to understand him.63 (Hashimoto’s sources, alas, appear not to indicate if Liddell 
– like any true Englishman - also raised his voice during his briefing).64 There were also 
fundamental differences between the British security service and those of regional allies. 
The UK’s security service was supposed to be politically neutral, serving the interests of 
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the UK as a whole rather than those of the political party in office.65 Scholars such as 
Bernard Porter may question whether MI5 was truly apolitical,66 but for states such as Iran, 
Turkey or Jordan the core role of the SAVAK, MIT or Mukhabarat were the absolute 
guarantor of régime security.67 The model of ‘policing by consent’,68 which supposedly 
remains part and parcel of the domestic British approach to law enforcement, was also alien 
to states such as Iraq, where policing by coercion occurred by default.69 The experiences 
of more recent interventions in the Middle East indicate that this is not a purely historical 
problem. 
 
Finally, Hashimoto points out the inherent paradox in British counter-subversive policy: 
‘Whitehall’s anti-Communist approach therefore had an unintended consequence: it 
hampered Britain’s own independent espionage operations through fear of eroding 
goodwill’.70 Successful examples of bilateral or multilateral intelligence co-operation such 
as the ‘Five Eyes’ relationship rely on mutual trust, which in this case involves the informal 
agreement that the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will not spy on each 
other.71 With British intelligence and security co-operation with South-West Asian 
partners, an implicit part of the bargain was that liaison work involved close co-operation 
with the ruling regimes, at the expense of any effort by the UK’s representatives on the 
ground to develop their own independent sourc15es of intelligence within the societies they 
worked with. Britain (and, for that matter, the USA) were tied to working with autocratic 
regimes that had an ultimately weak support base in society, and that were inherently 
fragile. Hashimoto also portrays the British as being in a position of responsibility without 
influence with their allies, not least with reference to security force atrocities conducted by 
their allies. To take one example, SAVAK was not trained by its British – or for that matter 
its American or Israeli – founders to torture or murder detainees, and the UK’s diplomats 
and intelligence officers were clearly disconcerted by its ally’s human rights abuses. Yet 
Britain was complicit in its silence about such activities, with all the consequences as far 
as its reputation is concerned.72 
 
The Twilight of the British Empire is an outstanding piece of historical research, reflecting 
Hashimoto’s diligence and prowess as a scholar; Rory Cormac should also be commended 
for his work in editing this book and ensuring its publication. Hashimoto’s book  also has 
enduring relevance for more recent history, not least with the dangers of major powers 
viewing the complexities of regional politics through their own ideological lenses (such as 
during the Cold War in the past, and in the ‘War on Terror’ more recently).73 The ethical 
and political pitfalls of aligning with police states as allies, and also the danger of 
overlooking the fact that political beliefs that may be an anathema to Western societies 
may be seen elsewhere as a means of liberation from corrupt and despotic regimes.74 When 
finishing it, one inevitably feels a sense of sadness that we have been denied the fruits of 
further research from a historian of such promise. We were all been privileged to have had 
the gift of his scholarship, even if it was for such a brief period of time. Rest in peace 
Chikara.  
Geraint Hughes 
King’s College London 
E-mail: geraint.hughes@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Page | 9 
 
R. Gerald Hughes 
Aberystwyth University 
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· 力さんを偲びつつ、サワさんとミヤカさんへ。· 
· Er cof am Chikara ac i Sawa a Miyaka · 
· In memory of Chikara and for Sawa and Miyaka · 
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